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form of life; and so its emotion is part of the eternal ethical life of
God.
Thus we see that the dilemma which is fatal to Deism, namely, that in
creation God lays Himself open to reaction, limitation, passivity, emotion,
and so to weakness and deficiency, is solved for us. These were no new things
to God: they did not appear to Him to detract from His glory; they existed
quite apart from creation; they were of His being, and in them He expresses
Himself. Consequently when He graciously created a world, into which He
entered in relation, and so allowed all the consequences of
relationself-limitation, reactions, passivities, emotionsHe was doing no new
thing; He was simply expressing His nature in time as He expresses it
eternally.
In regard to God's creating Nature, it might conceivably be maintained that
He did not in any way limit Himself, because He was creating something wholly
under His own hand, capable of being acted on, but not of acting nor even of
reacting, whose smallest motion was really God's doing. And, being entirely
mechanical, it would have no point of resemblance or similarity with its
Maker. But what shall we say of man, God's conscious, knowing, willing,
feeling creation? How can we escape the conclusion that here at any rate there
is a point of similarity between God's will and man's; between God as mind and
man as mind; between God as knower and man as knower. If not, how could God
communicate with man? There cannot be |
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intelligent communication unless the receiver is to some extent like the sender.
To the oxen the hieroglyphics were, are, and will be, mere marks. But to us they
are messages simply because there is a point of mental similarity between us and
those who wrote them.. So prophecy itself involves this similarity between God's
mind and ours. But it is impossible for pure tanzih to admit any such
correspondence or similarity. Yet it attempts to assert the possibility of
communication. This is contradictory. If Islam replies that the world,
including man, is in every respect a tool in the hand of God's power, we say
that many of the former metaphysical difficulties still remain (see above);
and moreover that this makes impossible the quality of love in God; no one
loves a machine, though he have absolute power over it. And of course it is
even more impossible for a machine to love its worker, even on the assumption
that it is a conscious machine and one that can understand the communications
made to it by its Maker. But even this assumption (that the machine is somehow
rational) must be denied on pure tanzih principles. Why should
tanzih deny reality to the will of man as a free thing, that is
self-exercised, yet allow to man's intelligence that it is real and
self-exercised. So here there is a dilemma: either you allow that man's
intelligence is real, self-exercised, that is, capable of give and take, in
which case you must say that the knowledge of |
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